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INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARIES
A PATIENT'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
MEDICAL RECORDS
The Honorable Michael D. Kirby*t

I.

AN EXEMPLAR OF COMPARATIVE LAW

Issues of health law and policy present quandaries which are common
to societies at roughly the same stage of economic and social development. Such quandaries must be solved within the framework of each
country's legal tradition and societal values. There are dangers in assuming that a solution considered right for one country will be automatically

appropriate for another. This is especially so where differing legal systems intervene to make the borrowing of ideas awkward and, occasionally, inappropriate.
Sadly, it is rare to find an author who is equally at home in the world of
the common law and in the civil law tradition which dominates the European legal scene. But such an author is Dieter Giesen. Astonishingly
enough for us who have been brought up in the common law, most scholars and practitioners of the civil law tradition look down on our techniques as primitive: an arrested stage of legal development which has
never quite advanced to the codifiers who propelled the civil law into
what they see as a higher stage of development. We are berated for the
fuzziness of our thinking. If the intensely practical nature of our discipline, as a problem-solving system of law, gains occasional words of admiration, our general reluctance to embrace theory and our manifest
discomfiture in the presence of a broad concept produces a sense of irritation which is scarcely disguised. The dogged insistence upon the solution of the particular case, and the rearguard resistance to extrapolating
* Justice Michael Kirby A.C., C.M.G. President of the Court of Appeal of New
South Wales, Australia. President of the Court of Appeal of the Solomon Islands. The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance derived in the preparation of this essay from
Mr. Ben Gaffikin, Research Officer to the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
t [The footnotes follow the Australian system of citation. The Journal thanks espe-

cially Mr. Gaffikin for his kind assistance in assuring their accuracy.]
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from many cases to conceptualizing the legal principles involved, turns a
typical civil lawyer into a frenzy of displeasure at what we, the common
lawyers, look upon as our mighty works of legal craftsmanship.
Into this chasm of misunderstanding and mutual distaste occasionally
wanders a scholar who strives to bridge the gap between these two great
legal traditions of the world. Although both traditions began in Europe
(that is, if the British Isles are truly part of Europe), their legacy is now to
be found in the four corners of the world where they compete for influence in the legal r6gimes of humanity. To bridge the gap between the two
requires a subtlety of mind, a command of language and a willingness to
learn, which is all too often absent from the discipline of law. By its nature, law tends to be jurisdiction bound. It ordinarily attracts people who
are content with the intellectual constraints of their particular discipline.
It is this feature of law that makes the achievements of a scholar such as
Professor Giesen all the more remarkable.
His writing in comparative law, particularly in health law and policy, is
legendary. Equally at home in Berlin, Boston, Birmingham and Brisbane, he is truly an international scholar. I have had the privilege of being his guest at the Free University of Berlin and of teaching a class with
him, myself occasionally lapsing into faulty German. His insight, tolerance, and extraordinary knowledge of the detail of Australian jurisprudence command admiration bordering on astonishment. His ready
welcome to foreign visitors from common law countries is legendary. Notably, he counts among his close friends and colleagues in Berlin members of the German judiciary who have always enjoyed a close link to the
famous universities in which German law has long been taught.
It is perhaps appropriate that, in this volume dedicated to Professor Dr.
Dieter Giesen, I should write about the decision of the New South Wales
Court of Appeal in Breen v. Williams.1 The case concerned the right of a
patient under Australian law to have access to the patient's medical
records. Professor Giesen has made significant contributions to the debate on this issue. Indeed, I began my judgment in Breen by citing Professor Giesen's comparative analysis in his grand authoritative work,
InternationalMedical Malpractice Law.2
A. The Facts of the Case
The litigation in Breen was a by-product of the widely publicized ac1. [1994] 35 NSWLR 522.
2. J. C. B. Mohr, Tlbingen, (1988). Cited in above n 1 at 525.
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tions over defective silicon breast implants. The appellant in the case,
Ms. Julie Breen, was an Australian patient who had undergone bilateral
augmentation mammaplasty in October 1977. Subsequently, she noticed
the development of breast capsules. It was then that Dr. Cholmondeley
Williams, a specialist plastic surgeon of Sydney, Australia (the respondent
before the Court of Appeal), came into the picture. Concerned about the
breast capsules, Ms. Breen consulted Dr. Williams. After noting complaints of severe pain, occasioned by the application of pressure to the
capsules, Dr. Williams decided to operate. The operative procedure was
carried out in November 1978. After the operation, Ms. Breen discussed
the removal of the implants with Dr. Williams. However, there were no
further consultations with, or operations by, Dr. Williams.
In 1984, seven years after they had originally been inserted, the silicon
implants began to leak. Ms. Breen was alerted to the leakage of the
silicon gel by a lump under her left breast. The leak necessitated an operation, which was performed by another surgeon, Dr. I. A. McDougall.
He removed the offending implants.
Ms. Breen was not alone in the difficulties which she encountered after
having the silicon breast implant inserted. Thousands of women in many
countries of the world have experienced similar problems. The result has
been a large enterprise of litigation against, inter alios, the manufacturer
of the breast implants, the Dow Coming Company. This became known
as the "Silicon Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation." The
principle vehicle for this litigation is Lindsey v. Dow Coming Co.,' a class
action that began in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama. The case was assigned to District Court Judge S. C.
Pointer.
Ms. Breen wished to participate in that class action. So did some 2,000
Australian women who claimed to be in a like position. The number of
litigants in the United States class action was naturally considerably
larger. The defendants in the United States proceedings eventually succumbed. They conceded liability and agreed to settle. Under the terms
of the settlement, U.S. $4.2 billion was set aside as a settlement fund.
Overseas litigants were originally thought to be an "opt out class" who
could share in this settlement if they elected to do so. Australian litigants
were to be entitled to share in the fund unless they specifically chose to
opt out and pursue alternative remedies. However, on September 1,
1994, Judge Pointer made an order whereby the Australian litigants
3. Civ. A. 94-P-11558-S (N.D.Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (case was settled).
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(among others) were excluded from the settlement. But the judge gave
these litigants the right to share in the settlement fund on condition that
they were to "opt in" to the United States litigation before December 1,
1994, which was later extended. To do so, the Australians were required
to file with the Alabama court copies of the medical records supporting
their claims. It was this requirement which eventually brought Ms.
Breen's proceedings before the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
In August 1993, Ms. Breen's Australian attorneys wrote to Dr. Williams. On her behalf they requested that he provide them with copies of
all primary medical records which he held concerning her case. They
stressed that they were not interested in obtaining a new medical report
or any other type of summary. In line with the hitherto standard practice
of medical practitioners in New South Wales, Australia, Dr. Williams refused the request. He stated that it was a "longstanding legal tradition"4
that such records were the "property" of the medical practitioner. They
were, he claimed, "an aide memoire to [his] treatment of the patient."'
There is no doubt that under the law of New South Wales, and indeed
throughout Australia (and countries of a like legal tradition), access to
medical records may be secured by compulsory court process. Judges of
relevant courts may make orders for the compulsory production of medical records. Judges of the Supreme Courts of the States of Australia may
do so at the request of a judge in specified jurisdictions, including the
Federal District Courts in the United States of America. Letters rogatory
were secured from Judge Pointer in the case of several Australian litigants
for this very purpose. Clearly, however, this is a time-consuming and
costly process. It places obstacles in the path of the plaintiffs who had
been seeking compensation from the United States implant manufacturers for many years. It was allegedly for this reason that the solicitors who
had been acting for Ms. Breen (as well as the 2,000 other Australian women involved in the Australian part of the litigation) decided to launch a
"test case." The issue in the case was not whether patients could eventually access their medical records by enforceable legal process. It was
whether they had a right to access such records without court orders.
Ms. Breen's legal proceedings began when, in May 1994, she issued a
summons out of the Supreme Court of the State of New South Wales.
The summons came for hearing before Justice Bryson in the Equity Division of the State Supreme Court. Ms. Breen submitted that there were
4. Above n 1 at 528.
5. Above n 1 at 528.
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four bases upon which Justice Bryson might find that she had a right of
access to her medical records. These were (1) that there was a right of
access under the common law of Australia; (2) that the common law
would provide such a right in furtherance of the fundamental rights contained in the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights6 which
Australia has ratified and which may thereby influence Australian common law in the case of an uncertainty or ambiguity; (3) that the right
arose as an incident of the fiduciary duty owed by a medical practitioner
to a patient; and (4) that the right was necessarily implied in the patient's
common law right to know relevant information about treatment before,
during, and after the treatment was given.
Before analyzing the way in which Justice Bryson and the Judges of the
New South Wales Court of Appeal approached each of these alleged bases of the right of access, it is worth briefly reviewing the developments of
this area of law in two other common law countries, the United Kingdom
and Canada. Such a review is important for two reasons. First, it places
the Australian approach to this issue in its international context. More
importantly, it provides a background to the approach taken by the Australian judges in this case, for each of them, in varying degrees, examined,
criticized or relied upon the developments in the other common law
countries.
II.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

In the United Kingdom the issue of a patient's right of access to their
medical records has now been approached by the enactment of legislation. The general Data Protection Act of 1984,7 was followed by the
more robust and specific Access to Health Records Act of 1990.8 For this
reason, developments in the United Kingdom are only of limited assistance to Australian courts because there is no relevant general access legislation in Australia. Following the enactment of the Access to Health
Records Act, the English Court of Appeal in Regina v. Mid Glamorgan
Family Health Services Authority; ex parte Martin9 appears to have recognized an innominate common law right of patient access to their medical
records. In Mid Glamorgan, a patient sought access to medical records
which had come into existence before the enactment of the Access to
6. Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, Human Rights: A Compilation of International
Instruments, United Nations, New York, 1988, p 18.
7. Data Protection Act 1984 (UK).
8. Access to Health Records Act 1990 (UK).
9. [1995] 1 WLR 110 (CA).
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Health Records Act. His claim, therefore, had to be determined on the
basis of the common law. At first instance, Justice Popplewell dismissed
the claim on the basis that, prior to the Act, there was no right at common law to secure access to medical records of a public health authority.Y' The English Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. However, in
doing so, each of the judges made remarks favorable to a patient's right
of access to medical records. For example, Lord Justice Evans said:
In my judgment, there is no good reason for doubting either that
a right of access does exist or that it is qualified to [the extent at
least expressed now in the statute section 5(1)(c)]. The record is
made for two purposes which are relevant here: first, to provide
part of the medical history of the patient, for the benefit of the
same doctor or his successors in the future; and, secondly, to
provide a record of diagnosis and treatment in case of future
inquiry or dispute. Those purposes would be frustrated if there
were no duty to disclose the records to medical advisors or to
the patient himself, or his legal advisers, if they were required in
connection with a later claim. Nor can the duty to disclose for
medical purposes be limited, in my judgment, to future medical
advisers .... 1
Both Lord Justice Nourse and Sir Roger Parker, concurring, made
comments in a similar vein. However, each of these judges disposed of
the case by affirming that patients have no right of access to their medical
records if such access is likely to endanger their physical or mental health.
Thus, they were able to avoid spelling out the jurisprudential basis of the
common law right which they had recognized (a typical common law solution, the civil law might lament). In my opinion in Breen I observed:
The most that can be derived from Regina v. Mid Glamorganis
that it is an indication, at a high level of the English courts, and
outside the obligations of statute, that an assertion bya medical
practitioner of absolute ownership and control of "his" medical
records concerning a patient, is unacceptable to the common
law of England. But Mid Glamorgan fails to provide the conceptual explanation, by reference to a known legal classification,
which will support the conclusions expressed in a 12
way that is
coherent and convincing in terms of legal principle.
For this reason the decision in Ex Parte Martin remains somewhat un10. See (1993) 16 BMLR 81.
11. Above n 9 at 119.
12. Above n 1 at 541.
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satisfying.' 3 It did not provide an appropriate or convincing basis on
which to build a general common law right of patient access in Australian
law.
The Canadian Supreme Court adopted a different approach to this issue, relying on the equitable law of fiduciaries. In both McInerney v.
MacDonald,4 and Norberg v. Wynrib; Women's Legal and Action Fund,

Intervener,'5 the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada held that there
existed a fiduciary relationship between medical practitioner and patient,
and that this duty supported the right of the patient to access medical
records about them. Building on a line of United States decisions, 16 Justice La Forest, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in Mclnerney,
held that the fiduciary duty of a medical practitioner to provide access to
medical records was ultimately grounded in "the nature of the patient's
interests in his or her records."' 7 He stated further:
Information about one's self revealed to a doctor acting in a
professional capacity remains, in a fundamental sense, one's
own. The doctor's position is one of trust and confidence. The
information conveyed is held in a fashion somewhat akin to a
trust. While the doctor is the owner of the actual record[,] the
information is to be used by the physician for the benefit of the
patient. The confiding of the information to the physician for
medical purposes gives rise to an expectation that the patient's
interest in and control of the information will continue.... The
trust-like "beneficial interest" of the patient in the information
indicates that, as a general rule, he or she should have a right of
access to the information and that the physician should have a
corresponding obligation to provide it.
The application of the fiduciary nature of the patient-doctor relationship to the issue of access to medical records seemed to me to be a very
persuasive approach. As I shall show, the approach of the Canadian
Supreme Court was closely scrutinized in Breen, both at first instance,
and before the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
13. See "Access to Medical Records: Breen v Williams" [1995] Med L Rev 102 at 105 106.
14. (1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415.

15. (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449.
16. See e.g. Emmett v Eastern Dispensary and Casualty Hospital 396 F 2d 931 (1967);
Cannell v Medical and Surgical Clinic 315 NE 2d 278 (1974).

17. Above n 14 at 424.
18. Above n 14 at 424 - 425.
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III.

THE PRIMARY JUDGE'S DECISION IN BREEN

Justice Bryson was not impressed by the claims that there was a right of
access to be found in the common law. His Honor was not persuaded by
the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Ex Parte Martin. He felt, I
think with some justification, that the decision was largely influenced
both by the later legislative developments in the United Kingdom, and by
the European and international human rights covenants, rather than by
any purely common law right easily defined and enforced.
Justice Bryson was also unimpressed by the argument put forward by
Ms. Breen on the basis of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights.19 She had relied on the fundamental rights embodied in the
Covenant, and in particular, the peoples' right to self-determination mentioned in Article 1. Ms. Breen also referred Justice Bryson to the decision in Gaskin v. United Kingdom (Access to PersonalFiles),20 in which
the European Court of Human Rights had disapproved of an English
Court of Appeal decision on the basis that it breached Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.2 1 In rejecting this limb of Ms.
Breen's arguments, Justice Bryson noted that neither of these conventions was in force as part of Australian domestic law.
Taming to the third argument put forward by Ms. Breen, that based on
the alleged fiduciary duty which a medical practitioner owes to the patient, Justice Bryson was not persuaded by the Canadian authority. His
Honor felt that in Mclnerney, Justice La Forest had "dealt dismissively
with the concern that disclosure would lead to a decrease in completeness, candour and frankness."' Justice Bryson was unwilling to extend
the fiduciary principle so as to encompass the right of access claimed
before him.
The final argument put forward by Ms. Breen in the proceedings
before Justice Bryson relied on a patient's implied right to know any relevant information concerning his or her treatment. This point was pressed
before Justice Bryson by the Public Interest Advocacy Center (PIAC),
which had intervened in the case as an amicus curiae. The PIAC submitted that the patient's "right to know" was to be inferred from the reason19. Above n 6.
20. (1989) 12 EHRR 36.
21. This decision occasioned the amendment of English law by the enactment of the
Access to Health Records Act.
22. Breen v Williams, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Bryson J, 10 October 1994,
unreported, at 51.
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ing of the High Court of Australia in Rogers v. Whitaker.' In that case,
the High Court of Australia, the Federal Supreme Court of Australia, had
upheld a patient's right to know about the risks involved in particular

surgical procedures. It had rejected the alternative, implying that it
amounted to a kind of medical paternalism. Justice Bryson rejected this
argument. He did not consider that the reasoning in Rogers could support a general legal right of access to medical records.
In conclusion, Justice Bryson rejected each of the alleged bases for Ms.
Breen's right of access to the medical records. His Honor said:
In my opinion there is no ground in the facts of this case on
which the defendant's ownership of the documents should not
be recognised as entitling him to control access to them. The
existing legal process for compelling production of documents
for the purpose of the conduct of litigation is not inadequate.24
IV.

THE CASE BEFORE THE NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

In the proceedings before the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the
arguments of the parties were somewhat refined. Ms. Breen confined her
argument based on fundamental rights to the suggestion that where there
is an ambiguity of legislation, or a gap in the Australian common law
affecting basic rights, it was now legitimate for Australian courts to have
regard to international human rights jurisprudence in resolving the ambiguity or filling the gap.' In this sense, Ms. Breen urged that the Court
should consider Article 17.1 of the International Covenant as a proper
influence upon the development of the general law of Australia-not as
part of that law but as an indication of how it should be developed when
that could be legitimately done.
Ms. Breen submitted a further ground on which the Court might find a
right of access to medical records. It was argued that it was an implied
term of the contract between Ms. Breen and Dr. Williams that he would
provide her with access to the information contained in his medical
records on demand.
In addition, there was a slight softening in the extreme attitudes and
23. (1992) 175 CLR 479.
24. Above n 22 at 77.
25. This view is now widely accepted in Australian law. See Mabo & Ors v Queensland
[No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42; Chu Kheng Lim & Ors v The Ministerfor Immigration, Local
Government and Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1992) 176 CLR 1, 38; Young v Registrar,Court of
Appeal & Anor [No 3] (1993) 32 NSWLR 262 (CA), 274,290. Cf Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Limited [1992] QB 770 (CA), 811, 829.
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absolute positions which the parties had taken before the primary judge.
Just as the Canadian Supreme Court in McInerney, and the English Court
of Appeal in Ex ParteMartin, had recognized that limitations existed on
the right of access, Ms. Breen acknowledged that certain classes of information of the kind likely to be held by Dr. Williams would need to remain confidential. Ms. Breen reformulated her claim to allow Dr.
Williams to maintain the confidentiality of the records in three specific
situations: (1) where the information had been created, or obtained,
solely for his own benefit (e.g., fees and administrative records); (2)
where the disclosure would, in the reasonable belief of Dr. Williams, be
likely to cause serious harm to the physical or mental health of Ms. Breen
(the so-called "therapeutic privilege" exception); or (3) where the disclosure would found an action for breach of confidence; i.e., by a third
person.
It was agreed that, in Ms. Breen's case, the first exception would encompass only the communications between Dr. Williams and his insurer,
the New South Wales Medical Defence Union. It had been accepted
before Justice Bryson that the "therapeutic privilege" exception had no
application to the actual facts before the Court. It was included and acknowledged by Ms. Breen to reflect the nature of the proceedings as a
test-case relevant to other cases where patients were not as robust as Ms.
Breen. The third exception was formulated to meet one of the main policy objections that had been put forward by Dr. Williams: the undesirability of third parties who had communicated with Dr. Williams (or a person
in a like position) while relying on the traditional expectation of confidentiality between doctor and patient, later being exposed to harm, embarrassment, or the possibility of litigation where that confidentiality is
breached.
V.

REJECrION OF THE COMMON LAW CLAIMS

The Court of Appeal was unanimous in rejecting each of the common
law claims brought by Ms. Breen to justify the right of access to the medical records. These claims were, the asserted contractual right, the claim
of proprietary right, the reliance on fundamental human rights, the assertion of an innominate common law right, and a claim that the right of
access was founded on a patient's "right to know."
The claim in contract was swiftly dismissed by the Court of Appeal. In
my opinion, I said:
It would not be consonant with the rules binding on this Court
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for the finding of an implied term in a contract between a patient and a specialist medical practitioner in 1978 to hold that it
included an implied term that the patient would have direct access to the information in the raw material of the medical practitioner's files.... Such a term was not necessary to give efficacy
to the arrangement between the parties. It was far from selfevident.2 6
In a similar vein, Justice Mahoney, the senior Judge of Appeal, held
that although a medical practitioner might be contractually bound to
make the medical information in his or her files available to the patient,
no term should be implied that the patient is to have the legal right to
compel inspection of the file itself. Justice Mahoney reasoned that regardless of the approach taken in arguing for an implied term, an implied
right to compel inspection does not exist.2 7
The claim of a "proprietary right and interest" in the actual information contained in the records was similarly unsuccessful. I pointed out2
that the information in question could not be disembodied from the medium in which it is contained; i.e., the paper with typed or handwritten
notes. Since this paper belonged exclusively to Dr. Williams, it was his to
use in whatever manner he so pleased. Justice Meagher, the other Judge
of Appeal participating, also dismissed this claim, noting that both the
High Court of Australia, and the New South Wales Court of Appeal had
each earlier held that mere knowledge cannot be property.2 9
Although he reached a similar conclusion, Justice Mahoney discussed
the claim of a proprietary right in more detail than either Justice Meagher
or myself. Justice Mahoney discussed the principles which have been applied in Australia to determine the ownership of the various documents
which have come into existence as a result of the relationship between
what he termed "professionals" and their clients. He discussed the rights
of ownership in light of three particular factors: the nature of the relationship between the parties; the purpose to be achieved by that relationship;
26. Above n 1 at 538.
27. For a discussion of the attempt to imply a contractual term in this case, the
problems with basing Ms. Breen's claim on contract, and possible future developments in
the use of contract law in a non-commercial context see R. S. Magnusson, "ATriumph for
Medical Paternalism: Breen v Williams, Fiduciaries, and Patient Access to Medical
Records" (1995) 3 TLJ at 31-32.

28. Above n 1 at 538.
29. Justice Meagher cited the decisions in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v United
Aircraft Corporation(1943) 68 CLR 525 (HC) at 534-536; and Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v
Philip Morris Ltd (1982) 64 FLR 387 (NSWCA).
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and the particular terms of the contract between them. His conclusion, in
general terms, was that the ownership of documents will vary depending
on each of the particular factors. In the case of a medical practitioner,
Justice Mahoney concluded that prima facie a medical file kept by a medical practitioner was the property of the practitioner. However, certain
documents, such as specialist reports paid for by the patient, might, in
some circumstances, become the property of their patient. Importantly,
Justice Mahoney determined that notes taken by a medical practitioner,
where they included particular observations made by the practitioner
(what Dr. Williams described as his "musings"), remained the property of
the medical practitioner.
The third common law claim asserted by Ms. Breen relied, in the revised way which I have described, on what she described as "fundamental
human rights." 30 I dealt with this submission only briefly. The other
judges ignored it altogether as outside orthodox legal reasoning in Australia, where there are few constitutionally guaranteed rights and none
which were relevant to the issue. In my view, Ms. Breen could not rely
on the International Covenant to assert any common law right because
that instrument has not been incorporated into Australian domestic law.
The Covenant could influence the development of the law, but it could
not provide a cause of action where previously none existed.
The main basis on which Ms. Breen sought to find a common law right
of access to the medical records was the assertion of an innominate common law right. In this way, Ms. Breen sought to rely on the English decision in Ex ParteMartin. Until recently, such English decisions of general
common law exposition were often regarded uncritically in Australia and
applied with almost automatic diligence. As I have pointed out above,
the decision in Martin was unsatisfying, as well as being an inappropriate
basis upon which to build a right of access, because it lacks a solid jurisprudential foundation. Rather than explaining why such a right might
exist, the members of the English Court of Appeal simply assumed its
existence. In fact, the decision in Ex Parte Martin appears to have been
largely influenced by both the passage of statutory rights of access in
England, and the criticism which the European Court of Human Rights
in Gaskin had directed at the English common law.
Justice Mahoney concluded that the decision in Ex Parte Martin was
more about a right of access to the information held in medical records
than a right of physical access to the medical records, such as was claimed
30. Above n 1 at 539.
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by Ms. Breen. Viewed in this manner, Justice Mahoney was inclined to
support the decision. However, his Honor did not think that Ms. Breen
could rely upon it to assert the particular right which she was claiming.
So this claim too was rejected.
The final common law claim asserted by Ms. Breen was that a right of
access to medical records was implied by the obligation of a medical practitioner to provide information to a patient concerning a medical procedure. This obligation was confirmed by the High Court of Australia in
Rogers v. Whitaker.3

I did not accept that the right of access could be

drawn from the decision in Rogers. I was unwilling to confine the decision in Rogers in the manner suggested on behalf of Dr. Williams. He
suggested that Rogers spelt out the entire parameters of a medical practitioner's obligation to provide information to a patient concerning a medical procedure. On the other hand, I was also unable to accept that Ms.
Breen could successfully maintain her claim on the basis of the decision.
I said:
I cannot derive from Rogers the general "right to know" which
Ms. Breen asserts. It would be curious and unconvincing to derive that right from the law of negligence, via a case of such
peculiarity and then embellish it to provide the foundation for
an asserted right of access to information in private medical
records. There is a quantum leap from the entitlement of a
proper explanation by a medical practitioner about the dangers
of medical procedures as incidental to treatment to an affirmative obligation to give access to information in records by a medical practitioner who has not been sued and who has never been
said to have failed in his duty of explanation to his patient.32
VI.

THE RIGHT OF ACCESS AS AN INCIDENT OF A FIDUCIARY

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOCTOR AND PATIENT

On the fiduciary issue, each of the members of the Court of Appeal
reached a different conclusion. I concluded that the medical practitionerpatient relationship could properly be characterized as fiduciary in nature, and that one incident of this relationship was that the patient has a
right of access to his or her medical records as held by the medical practitioner. On the other hand, while Justice Meagher was willing to concede

that the medical practitioner-patient relationship could be classed as fiduciary, his Honor did not think that the practitioner's duties as a fiduciary
31. Above n 23.
32. Above n 1 at 541 - 542.
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would extend so far as to generate in the patient a right to inspect the
medical notes and records. Hence the reasoning of Justice Meagher and
of myself diverged on the issue of the content of the fiduciary obligation.
Finally, Justice Mahoney rejected the idea that the relationship between a
medical practitioner and his or her patient could be characterized as fiduciary in nature.
Justice Mahoney examined the decision in McInerney v. MacDonald in
some detail. He concluded that, although it was not the function of Australian courts to consider the correctness of the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Canada, insofar as it stated the law of Canada, all of the premises relied upon by Justice La Forest in McInerney did not correctly state
the law of fiduciaries in New South Wales, Australia. Nor did Justice Mahoney agree that the conclusions drawn by the Canadian court followed
from those premises. In particular, he thought that it was wrong to infer
that a fiduciary relationship existed between a medical practitioner and a
patient merely because of the requirement that a medical practitioner
acts with the utmost good faith and loyalty towards his or her patient and
holds information given by the patient in confidence. Justice Mahoney
was also troubled by what he perceived as the failure of the Canadian
Supreme Court in McInerney to distinguish between the duty of the medical practitioner to convey information to the patient, and what the court
termed "the obligation to grant access to the information the doctor uses
in administering treatment., 33 While he thought the former duty would
ordinarily exist, Justice Mahoney was unwilling to recognize the latter.
I began my analysis of this issue by reviewing the law of fiduciary obligations as it currently stands in New South Wales, and indeed, throughout
Australia. I conducted this review by stating six propositions. First, I
stated that "the fiduciary principle is in a state of development whose
impetus has not been spent to the present day. ' 3 4 This, I think, is uncontroversial. Secondly, I noted that the development of society has necessitated an expansion of the scope of the fiduciary principle. Furthermore,
"it is to meet new circumstances that the criteria of fiduciary relationships, and the duties thereby imposed, remain rather vague., 35 Thirdly, I
pointed out that the trustee-beneficiary relationship recognized in Keech
v. Sandford,3 6 had been extended, by analogical reasoning, to other relationships involving trust and confidence.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Above n 14 at 424.
Above n 1 at 543.
Above n 1 at 543.
(1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; 25 ER 223.
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The fourth proposition which I noted was that, although fiduciary obligations were first developed in a commercial context, the fiduciary principle should not be limited to commercial relationships. These were mere
species of the genus. They could not possibly define and limit the application of the fiduciary principle. The search, therefore, was for a unifying
notion, common to all the relationships which the law considered to be
fiduciary in nature. In this regard, I accepted Professor (now Justice)
Finn's analysis:
What must be shown.., is that the actual circumstances of a
relationship are such that one party is entitled to expect that the
other will act in his interests in and for the purposes of the relationship. Ascendancy, influence, vulnerability, trust, confidence
and dependence doubtless will be of importance in making this
out, but they will be important only to the extent that they evidence a relationship suggesting that entitlement. The critical
matter in the end is the role the alleged fiduciary had, or should
be taken to have, in the relationship. It must so implicate that
party in the other's affairs or so align him with the protection or
advancement of that other's interests
that the foundation exists
' '37
for the "fiduciary expectation.
Fifthly, I dealt with the significance of a contractual relationship to the
recognition of fiduciary duties. I pointed out that a fiduciary relationship
may coexist with a contractual relationship. In doing so, it will neither
distort the contract nor be distorted by the implication of terms adverse
to continuing fiduciary obligations.
The final point I made in my opinion was that a person may be in a
fiduciary relationship in some aspects of his or her activities and not in
other aspects. Again, this proposition is in no serious doubt. Even where
a fiduciary relationship between two parties has been established in certain circumstances, it will be necessary to regard the facts surrounding the
particular transaction to see whether it requires the application of fiduciary duties.
Having examined the general state of law of fiduciary obligations, I
turned to consider whether any such obligations could be read into the
relationship between Ms. Breen and Dr. Williams. I traced a line of
United States decisions38 which had recognized the existence of a fiduciary relationship between a medical practitioner and his or her patient. I
37. P Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" in T Youdan, Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts

(1989) 1 at 46f.
38. See above n 16.
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then examined the judgment of Justice La Forest in Mclnerney which
built upon these United States decisions. I was impressed by his Lordship's reasoning. I said:
I find this analysis wholly convincing. It does not stand alone.
Both in New Zealand and indeed in this Court, it has been
stated, or inferred, that for some purposes the relationship of
medical practitioner and patient is a fiduciary one or can give
rise to applicable fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Duncan v. Medical
Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 513
(H.C.), 520f; Smith Kline and French LaboratoriesLtd. v. Attorney-General [1989] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385, (H.C.) 396; Wickstead and
Ors v. Browne (1992) 30 N.S.W.L.R. 1 (C.A.), 19. A court of
common law may not be able to disentangle the ownership of
the paper or other medium in or on which intimate personal
information about the patient is kept and the right of access to
that information against the reluctance of the owner. But a
court of equity can do so. It can do so in an established fiduciary relationship, out of regard to the special and intimate interests of the patient in the content of the medical information
39
which concerns nobody more directly than the patient.
Having concluded that a fiduciary relationship existed between Dr.
Williams and Ms. Breen as medical practitioner and patient, I then turned
to examine the duties which arose from that relationship, and specifically,
the question of whether a right of access to the medical practitioner's files
was an incident of the fiduciary character of the relationship.
What are the policy considerations which are relevant to the courts
when deciding whether to recognize a right of access to the practitioner's
files? The considerations which favor the rejection of such a right are (1)
the possibility that any information secured might actually harm the patient; i.e., the so-called "therapeutic privilege;" (2) the fact that such access might sometimes expose the practitioner to the risk of being sued;
and (3) the fact that, since it had not been previously thought that a patient could gain access to their medical records, certain of these documents may have been written or prepared in a more guarded manner had
the right of access then existed and been recognised. Expectations should
not be disappointed. Moreover, it was suggested that the provision of the
right claimed by Ms. Breen, given its wide-reaching consequences, was
properly a matter for Parliament and not the courts.
Ranged against these considerations are the factors which support the
39. Above n 1 at 545.
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recognition of the right as an attribute of the fiduciary duty owed by a
medical practitioner to a patient in some circumstances. These include
(1) the recognition that the duty of the medical practitioner to act in the
patient's best interests would limit and control any unnecessary collection
of information harmful, or prejudicial, to a patient. Furthermore, the
medical practitioner would retain the "therapeutic privilege" and the obligation of protection of the confidences of third parties; (2) the primacy
of the patient's interest in information which concerns their personal integrity and autonomy; (3) the inadequacy of summaries as a substitute for
a right of access, especially in today's more mobile society; (4) the advances in information technology, which have made the provision of access to a patient's information fie both a realistic and a generally
inexpensive option; (5) the recent changes in the medical practitionerpatient relationship, at least in Australia, whereby patients are now less
blindly trusting and more assertive of their entitlements to information
about themselves and medical care and to legal and other redress where
this is not adequately provided; (6) the fact that information about a patient is lawfully provided to a great profusion of health professionals and
paramedicals involved in the treatment of the patient. It was argued that
it is a trifle unpersuasive that access should be denied to the person most
intimately involved (the patient) when so may others may gain that access; (7) legislative developments in Australia, both Federal and State,
which have afforded a right of access to medical records held on a patient
in a public hospital or in other public records. The common law should
develop in general harmony with these statutory provisions; and (8) the
fact that a patient can invoke court procedures to secure access to the
information in the original records and can therefore ultimately enforce a
right. In response to the claim that medical records would probably become briefer and less candid, the response of Justice La Forest in Mclnerney" was convincing. Knowledge of a right of access, and the resultant
increase in accountability may, in fact, improve the accuracy, contents,
and sufficiency of the medical records. The burden of any additional time
and costs would, if reasonable, be borne by the patient.
This examination of the competing policy considerations affecting the
development and extension of the current state of the law in Australia on
this topic led me to the conclusion that the Court of Appeal should recognize the right of a patient to gain access to his or her original medical
records as an incident of the fiduciary relationship between a medical
40. Above n 14 at 429.

110

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:93

practitioner and his or her patient. Once this had been established, it was
clear that, in failing to provide Ms. Breen with proper access to the information which she sought, Dr. Williams had been in breach of his fiduciary
duty. The unacceptable character of his breach was demonstrated, it
seemed to me, by Dr. Williams' clear indication that he would provide
access, but only if he were completely released from all legal liability to
Ms. Breen. This indicated that Dr. Williams' concerns were ultimately to
protect himself, not to advance the interests of the patient. Indeed, if the
patient wanted the records she could get them-provided she went to the
cost and suffered the delay and inconvenience of securing letters rogatory
from the United States court.
VII.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE FOR THE ASSERTED RIGHT OF

AccEss IN

AUSTRALIA

"

My view on the nature and incidents of the relationship between Dr.
Williams and Ms. Breen was not shared by the other judges in Breen. My
purpose here is not to reargue our judicial debates for that is found in the
law reports. Under our conventions, judges do not reargue their professional opinions in public debate. Rather, my purpose is to describe the
controversy and to call attention to the issue; one pertinent to the relationship between medical practitioners and their patients ih the world today. As I stated above, Justice Meagher was willing to recognize the
existence of a limited fiduciary relationship between a medical practitioner and his or her patient. He was not, however, willing to recognize a
right of access to medical records as an incident of this relationship. Justice Mahoney was not even prepared to characterize the medical practitioner-patient relationship as fiduciary in nature. Therefore, by majority,
Ms. Breen's claim was dismissed by the New South Wales Court of
Appeal.
However, the story does not end there. After her initial appeal was
rejected, Ms. Breen sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of
Australia. On May 12, 1995, the High Court of Australia granted special
leave to appeal-the first step on the way to appellate review. It did,
however, reserve the right to revoke the grant of special leave, in particular, if any legislative intervention made the determination of the issues in
the case redundant. The appeal to the High Court will otherwise probably be heard some time in early 1996.
I conclude this note, with all due modesty, with a reference to some of
my closing remarks in Breen. These remarks reflect the importance of
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the issue before the Court and the need for fundamental rights, such as
the right of access to medical records, to be recognized and enforced, and
released from expensive and time-consuming legal procedures:
The fulfillment of the right asserted by a patient ought not to be
frustrated by requiring cumbersome, dilatory and expensive
court process to be issued. It ought not to be withheld in a purported bargain to provide it only if the patient, who is vulnerable, provides the medical practitioner with a release from all
possible claims, whatever they might be. This Court should uphold the patient's right in the present case by appropriately precise equitable relief.41
Professor Giesen, whom we honor in this volume of the Journal, is a
great teacher of comparative law in the context of medical law. By studying the decisions of the courts and other legal writers in other countries,
we can learn useful analogies for the approach to the general principles
which should govern the rights and duties of medical practitioners. In the
universal environment we have much to learn from each others' legal systems. Professor Giesen is a notable exemplar in this regard. But in the
end, the willingness of judges, or indeed any lawyer, to derive lessons
from other legal traditions depends upon their willingness to refer to the
experiences of others and an open-mindedness to learn from their
approaches.42

41. Above n 1 at 550.
42. In addition to those articles cited above, the decision in Breen v Williams was critically discussed in P. Parkinson, "Before the High Court - Fiduciary Law and Access to
Medical Records: Breen v Williams" (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 433.

